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LIFE WITH A NUCLEAR ARMED NORTH KOREA
By Robert Alvarez
February 23, 2003
See a Powerpoint presentation in Adobe Acrobat (.pdf)
format on this subject
Comments to Robert Alvarez
The Bush Administration's efforts to stop despotic nations from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction are being sorely tested by North Korea. Unlike
Iraq, the doctrine of preemptive military action is not on the "front
burner," given the likelihood of a second, very bloody Korean War,
just as a huge US military presence stands poised to attack in the Middle-East.
Hence, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) recently noted the Bush
Administration "argues that North Korea's actions do not constitute
a crisis."
Considering that the nuclear non-proliferation regime threatens to unravel
in the Far East and the collapse of a starving, heavily armed North Korea
could seriously destabilize its neighbors, perhaps the Bush Administration
ought to reconsider what a crisis is.
In resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, two major choices are on
the table - containment or engagement. Upon entering office, the Bush
Administration promptly squelched the Clinton engagement policy, and is
sticking to its guns in support of containment, as resistance mounts from
China, South Korea and Japan. It's instructive to see how the Bush containment
policy has worked so far.
After President Bush included North Korea as a member of the "Axis
of Evil," in January 2002, the United States finally sent its first
official delegation to Pyongyang for formal talks in October of last year.
At the meeting, Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly, confronted
North Korea over its efforts to acquire uranium enrichment technology.
While the quest for gas centrifuge technology is a legitimate concern,
it was the manner in which it was brought up that deserves attention.
Kelly issued an ultimatum to cease this activity, or terminate the Agreed
Framework between the United States and North Korea. The 1994 Agreed Framework
specifically froze North Korea's plutonium production program in exchange
for fuel oil, opening of commercial opportunities, and construction of
light water reactors.
Taken quite by surprise, the North Koreans abruptly ended the meeting.
The next morning, Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju responded by asserting
that North Korea possesses "more powerful" weapons and insisted
on a non-aggression pact with the US.
Enriched uranium is not specifically part of the 1994 Agreed Framework,
because at the time, such efforts were not considered credible. In five
years, North Korea could make fuel for ten times as many nuclear weapons
from its 1950's model plutonium program, than from a much more difficult
enrichment technology. Even if North Korea's uranium enrichment is far
more advanced, the Agreed Framework contains provisions that would place
it under full-scope international safeguards.
Instead the Bush Administration chose to hold the Agreed Framework hostage
at the Pyongyang meeting, in an "all or nothing" confrontation,
which blew up in their faces.
Undaunted, the Bush Administration then suspended heavy oil shipments
under the Agreed Framework in November. North Korea responded the next
month by announcing its intentions to restart plutonium production, expelling
IAEA inspectors, and taking steps to withdraw from the Nuclear Non Proliferation
Treaty. "By their own admission," says the CRS. "Bush Administration
officials were surprised by the intensity for North Koreas moves..."
This persistent blundering by the Bush Administration is having a seismic
impact in the Far East. With over five tons of plutonium in hand, well-advanced
missile capabilities, and the world's third largest nuclear energy program,
Japan can nuclearize its military assets with relative ease. "Our
nation will use military force as a self-defense measure if they start
to resort to arms against Japan," said Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba
recently.
Fortunately, Japan strongly prefers to keep its constitutional ban on
nuclear weapons. But will this be the case if North Korea resumes building
a nuclear arsenal and has missiles capable of reaching Japan?
Life with a starving, nuclear armed North Korea is now a very real possibility
thanks to the Bush containment policy, which now is fueling a growing
confrontation with profound implications.
A good place to start fixing this mess is to sit down once again with
North Korea to put things back on track. The Agreed Framework should not
be terminated. For all its criticisms, this agreement ceased plutonium
production for over 8 years. It started rapprochement with the Koreas
and Japan - the first big step toward a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula.
Meanwhile, the Bush Administration should stop degrading the threat posed
by nuclear non-proliferation, by using it as a pretext to reconfigure
power in the Middle-East and bolster politically unstable oil supplies.
In 1994 and 1995, as senior advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Energy,
Robert Alvarez led DOE Teams into North Korea to secure the reactor spent
fuel at the Yongbyon nuclear site.
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