March 14, 2007
By Erik Leaver

Full Text of Supplemental:
Part 1 * Part 2 * Part 3

While the House leadership has been in negotiations all week over the language of the Supplemental little information has been made to the public. IPS has received the text of the latest draft as of 3/14/07 at 4:00pm. In the public interest we are making this version of the bill public. The latest version of the bill has serious deficiencies. The granting of waivers for the President to allow non-combat ready troops and continue the use of stop-loss have been part of the public debate over the past week. The following provisions have not been widely discussed:

1) The language in Sec. 1904 (f)potentially leaves 40-60,000 troops in Iraq. The bill authorizes 4 categories of troops that can remain:

- Trainers: Current levels are ~6,000. But the ISG recommends 10-20,000. Potentially the President could use the ISG numbers
- Counter-terrorist forces: Marine Colonel Peter Devlin, stationed in Ramadi, Iraq, wrote a detailed and recently updated classified memo this past August on the situation in al-Anbar province, “State of the Insurgency in Al-Anbar,” he concluded that an additional division (15,000 – 20,000 troops) would be required. This fits with the classic counter-terrorism force structure of 10-1 as estimates of foreign fighters in Iraq are 2,000.
- Protection for Embassy/Diplomats: The intent in the language is unclear but at a minimum this would mean leaving protection for the Embassy in the Green Zone. It would likely include leaving protection for the Baghdad airport and the road between the airport and Green Zone. A larger troop presence could be larger if they are protecting the PRT areas. Force protection for these scenarios could range between 5,000-20,000. None of these projections include estimates for the number of military contractors that would be in support of the operations. The bill language does not have any restrictions on contractors.

2) Part 2 of Section 1904 stipulates that part of the certification should be dependent on enactment of a hydro-carbon law. This directly contradicts language in the current supplemental and is in violation of existing U.S. Public Law No: 109-234 that says: To provide that no funds made available by title I of this Act may be made available to establish permanent United States military bases in Iraq or to exercise control by the United States over the oil infrastructure or oil resources of Iraq. (Biden Amendment)

3) Section 1904 (g) makes economic aid dependent on the performance of the Iraqi govt. Tying the aid in this manner presents a similar dynamic to the sanctions era, where the population was punished for the actions of the Iraqi leadership. More importantly, cutting aid deprives the population that you need support from to reduce their tendency to engage in terrorist/insurgency activities.

4) The language largely follows the recommendations of the ISG plan but is missing the critical diplomatic components. As the ISG notes, to give the Iraqis the best chance of avoiding greater civil conflict, a diplomatic “surge” is needed. The “Coordinator for Iraq Assistance” outlined in Sec. 1905 takes a step in the right direction but there are no specific funds set forth in the bill, nor does the position

5) The bill notes that no funds shall be expended to “Establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of the US Armed Forces in Iraq” in Section 1311 but Chapter 7 provides billions for military construction funds. Similarly, there are funds for Research and Development, which, if troops are brought home by the proposed deadline, will still be in the pipeline when they return.

This article will be updated after the Appropriations Committee markup on Thursday, March 15.