UNDERSTANDING THE U.S.-IRAQ CRISIS:

I. The U.S. Rush to War

By Phyllis Bennis

A pamphlet of the Institute for Policy Studies, January 2003

Sections:I. The U.S. Rush to War / II. The World's Response, the UN & International Law / III. The Consequences of War: Iraq and Beyond / IV. The History of U.S.-Iraq Relations / V. Alternatives to War / Resource Guide

This Section:

The Bush administration says that a war against Iraq is needed for reasons of the threat of weapons of mass destruction, Iraq's support of terrorism, and human rights. Are those valid concerns?
What are the real reasons that underlay the administration's rush towards war?
What does "regime change" mean?
What is the Bush doctrine of 'preemptive strike'?
What are the "no-fly" zones? Why are U.S. planes bombing there already?
Who in the Bush administration supports going to war in Iraq?
Who is against going to war, or at least cautious?
Who will benefit from a war in Iraq?
Is Iraq a threat to the United States?
Does Iraq have weapons of mass destruction?
Did Iraq have anything to do with September 11th, or with al-Qaeda? Would going to war against Iraq improve the security of Americans at home and abroad?
If the U.S. doesn't attack Iraq, how can we be sure there are no weapons of mass destruction?
How much will war against Iraq cost? Who will pay for it and what will be its impact on the domestic U.S. economy?
The US administration has talked about plans for a long-term military occupation of Iraq. What would that mean?

1. The Bush administration says that a war against Iraq is needed due to the threat of weapons of mass destruction, Iraq's support of terrorism, and human rights. Are those valid concerns?

The government of Iraq has long been brutally repressive towards its own people, and has twice attacked other countries (Iran and Kuwait) over longstanding political, economic and security disputes. Iraq's apex as a military power came during the 1980s, as a result of its decade-long alliance with the United States, which (along with European and other U.S. allies) provided political, military, technological and financial support. In fact, it was during this period of the U.S.-Iraqi alliance that Baghdad committed its worst human rights violations.

But the 1991 Gulf War bombing and 12 years of debilitating sanctions severely diminished Iraq's military capacity. By the time the United Nations weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998 in anticipation of the U.S. "Desert Fox" bombing campaign, they had found and destroyed or rendered harmless 90 - 95% of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, including its chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles. They had also completely destroyed its unfinished nuclear efforts.

The Bush administration linked Iraq with North Korea and Iran as a so-called "axis of evil." Yet only Iraq is singled out for possible military attack. Unlike North Korea, which may already have nuclear weapons, has repudiated the Non-Proliferation Treaty, expelled UN nuclear inspectors and directly threatened the United States, Iraq does not have nuclear weapons and is giving UN arms inspectors open access. Unlike a number of other countries, Iraq has not made international terrorism its pattern. Iraq simply does not pose a threat to the United States.

2. What are the real reasons behind the administration's rush towards war?

U.S. threats to go to war against Iraq are largely driven by oil and empire - expanding U.S. military and economic power. As these goals primarily benefit oil companies and the already rich and powerful, the Bush administration relies on fear to mobilize public support for war among ordinary Americans by linking Iraq falsely with the very real threat of terrorism and through rhetoric like "axis of evil." Bush also plays on Americans' genuine concern about human rights to gain support.

Many top officials of the Bush administration come directly out of the oil industry. President Bush himself, as well as Vice-President Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans and others all have strong ties to oil companies - Chevron once named a tanker after Rice as a gesture of thanks.

But the U.S. isn't threatening an invasion simply to ensure its continued access to Iraqi oil. Rather, it is a much broader U.S. play for control of the oil industry and the ability to set the price of oil on the world market.

Iraq's oil reserves are second only to Saudi Arabia's. And with U.S.-backed Saudi Arabia increasingly unstable, the question of which oil companies - French, Russian, or American - would control Iraq's rich but unexplored oil fields once sanctions are lifted has moved to the top of Washington's agenda. Many in the Bush administration believe that in the long term, a post-war, U.S.-dependent Iraq would supplant Saudi control of oil prices and marginalize the influence of the Saudi-led OPEC oil cartel. Iraq could replace Saudi Arabia, at least partially, at the center of U.S. oil and military strategy in the region, and the U.S. would remain able to act as guarantor of oil for Japan, Germany, and other allies in Europe and around the world.

Expanding U.S. power, central to the Bush administration's war strategy, includes redrawing the political map of the Middle East. That scenario includes U.S. control of Iraq and the rest of the Gulf states as well as Jordan and Egypt. Some in the administration want even more - "regime change" in Syria, Iran, and Palestine, and Israel as a permanently unchallengeable U.S.-backed regional power. The ring of U.S. military bases built or expanded recently in Qatar, Djibouti, Oman and elsewhere as preparation for a U.S. war against Iraq will advance that goal.

But the super-hawks of the Bush administration have a broader, global empire-building plan that goes way beyond the Middle East. Much of it was envisioned long before September 11th, but now it is waged under the flag of the "war against terrorism." The war in Afghanistan, the creation of a string of U.S. military bases in the (also oil- and gas-rich) countries of the Caspian region and south-west Asia, the new strategic doctrine of "pre-emptive" wars, and the ascension of unilateralism as a principle are all part of their crusade. Attacking Iraq is only the next step.

3. What does "regime change" mean?

Regime change is a euphemism for the assassination or overthrow of Saddam Hussein. "Regime change" has been official U.S. policy since 1998's Iraq Liberation Act. The notion of the Iraqi people themselves, once economic sanctions are lifted and they are able to rebuild their country and their lives, working together to replace their government with one more representative and less repressive is simply not on Washington's agenda. It never was - although the first President Bush urged Iraqis to rise up against Saddam Hussein's government after the first Gulf War, he quickly abandoned the call to revolt and abandoned Iraqis to their fate.

4. What is the Bush doctrine of 'preemptive strike'?

In a major speech in June 2002 at the United States Military Academy at West Point, and in a strategy paper released in December 2002, Bush and his administration claimed the right to use preemptive military force against countries or terrorist groups deemed "close" to acquiring weapons of mass destruction or long-range missiles, and stated that the U.S. would "respond with overwhelming force" with "all options" - code for using nuclear weapons - to any use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons against the U.S., its troops or its allies.

Such threats of using nuclear weapons - in specific violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits the use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state - represent a significant escalation of U.S. military domination. This reflects a parallel call in the strategy documents for a new approach to military engagement in which the U.S. would prevent any nation, anywhere in the world, from even attempting to match U.S. military capacity.

Ironically, the word "preemption" does not even properly apply. The Bush strategy goes well beyond "preemption," which implies an imminent threat. Iraq, even according to those calling for war, does not pose an imminent threat to the United States. Rather, the Bush administration is actually calling for a "preventive" war, to preclude the hypothetical arming or strengthening of Iraq at any time in the future. "Preventive" war is clearly illegal.

5. What are the "no-fly" zones? Why are U.S. planes bombing there already?

At the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the U.S., together with the UK (and France, which soon ended its participation) established a "no-fly" zone in northern Iraq, and then, in 1992, in the south. The ostensible reason was to protect the Kurds in the north and the restive Shi'a population in the south from Iraqi attack by prohibiting the presence of fixed wing Iraqi military planes in the area. U.S. and British planes have patrolled the no-fly zones ever since. After the "Desert Fox" bombing raids of December 1998, the U.S. began regular bombing in both zones in response to Iraq's defensive moves of "locking on" radar or targeting the planes with anti-aircraft weapons, although no manned planes were ever hit. (Iraq has downed at least three "drone" aircraft without pilots.) In 1999, the only year for which reliable figures exist, the United Nations documented 144 civilians killed by U.S. bombing in the "no-fly" zones.

The U.S. claims that its bombing is to enforce UN resolutions, sometimes citing UN Resolution 688, which called on Iraq to protect the human rights of vulnerable communities. But no resolution, not 688 nor any other, mentions the creation of "no-fly" zones, let alone bombing or other military enforcement. When the UN resolution authorizing new inspections was passed in November 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed that Iraqi anti-aircraft defense against the bombers constituted a "material breach" of Iraq's obligations, but numerous Security Council ambassadors as well as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan strongly disagreed.

6. Who in the Bush administration supports going to war in Iraq?

The strongest voices for war in the administration are from the ideologues grouped around Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice-President Cheney. They include Rumsfeld's deputy Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, head of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, Cheney's chief of staff Lewis Libbey, and others. All have been urging stronger military action against Iraq for a decade or more; in 1998, they all signed an open letter to President Clinton demanding more aggressive military action against Iraq. Many of them were part of a campaign launched by the Project for the New American Century calling for a new foreign policy aimed at preventing any country from even aspiring to match U.S. power. Since almost none of them served in the military and none have actual combat experience, but they are arguing for a war that others will fight, they are known as "chicken hawks."

War remains their strategic option of choice for Iraq policy. Perle, for instance, told an audience of British parliamentarians in November 2002 that "even a clean bill of health" from the UN arms inspectors would not stave off a U.S. war against Iraq.

7. Who is against going to war, or at least cautious?

Opposition to a unilateral war with Iraq is widespread among the American people, with business, religious, and even military leaders opposed. Even more remarkable is the level of opposition within the administration itself.

The State Department, under Colin Powell, though not unequivocally opposed to war, supported a multi-lateral response based on using the United Nations to legitimize U.S. policies. Some political advisers in the White House are also thought to counsel an approach that includes a clear UN mandate, based on the assessment (according to Business Week and others) that a majority of Americans would not support a war viewed as unilateral and outside United Nations approval.

A number of former generals publicly urged caution, a sentiment reportedly shared by many of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well. General Anthony Zinni, chief of the U.S. Central Command (which includes Iraq) throughout much of the 1990s and later President Bush's special envoy to the Middle East, also has made clear his opposition to the Bush war drive.

8. Who will benefit from a war in Iraq?

U.S. oil companies would be among the first to benefit, through priority access to Iraq's oil reserves, the second largest in the world. This access means not only increased supply of crude oil, but also enormous power in the global oil market, undermining that of Saudi Arabia and OPEC. In the late 1990s through 2002, Iraq signed contracts that would give French and Russian oil companies privileged access to Iraqi reserves once economic sanctions were lifted. The U.S. has used these contracts to pressure France and Russia in Security Council deliberations. The threat - hinted at by U.S. officials and made explicitly by leaders of the Iraqi opposition - was that a post-Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq would void the existing contracts, and that French and Russian companies would have no access to new oil leases if their governments stood in the way of U.S. plans. (The countervailing concern is that in the short term a war-driven drop in oil production could have serious economic consequences. But most oil companies seem to believe they would benefit from the higher retail prices that would accompany such a production decrease. )

Companies producing and installing oil equipment would also benefit. Vice-President Cheney was CEO of one such company, Halliburton Oil Services, before returning to Washington in 2001 as part of the Bush administration. Between 1997 and 2001, Halliburton under Cheney's leadership made deals with Iraq worth at least $73 million to rebuild Iraq's war- and sanctions-shattered oil infrastructure, but U.S.-led sanctions limited this reconstruction. With the U.S. military in control of a post-war Iraq, and U.S. oil companies in privileged positions, oil sanctions would certainly be lifted and companies like Halliburton would win giant rehabilitation contracts.

U.S. arms manufacturers would also benefit. Military producers have already won new, expanded contracts to produce more and better weapons. Boeing Aircraft, for instance, manufacturer of the "J-DAM" kits that transform huge lethal 500 and 2000-pound bombs into huge lethal 500 and 2000-pound "smart" bombs, is working around the clock on Pentagon contracts to produce the kits in anticipation of an Iraq war. Boeing is building a new 30,000-square-foot factory in St. Charles, LA to keep up with demand and its suppliers, including Lockheed, Honeywell, and Textron, are also ramping up production. Boeing spokesman Bob Algarotti anticipates "a higher level of production through the end of the decade."

9. Is Iraq a threat to the United States?

Iraq's military is much smaller and weaker than before the 1991 Gulf War; the Pentagon estimates it is only about one-third its earlier size. It lacks the missile capacity to reach even most of its neighbors, let alone the United States. President Bush on one occasion claimed Iraq had pilotless drones that could fly across the ocean and attack the U.S., an obvious flight of rhetorical fancy that was never repeated. Iraq has attempted to attack U.S. bombers in the "no-fly" zones, planes that are illegally intruding into Iraqi airspace and attacking Iraqi targets; withdrawal of U.S. planes would end these [so far unsuccessful] efforts to bring them down. (See question 5 for more on the "no-fly" zones.)

In the State Department's 2001 edition of its annual Report on Global Terrorism, the U.S. acknowledged that Iraq "has not attempted an antiWestern attack since its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush in 1993 in Kuwait." (Whether this plot even happened remains in dispute.)

10. Does Iraq have weapons of mass destruction?

We don't know for sure - that's why the UN inspectors are in Iraq. As of the end of 2002, the inspectors have not indicated they have found evidence of any viable weapons programs. When the earlier inspection team, UNSCOM, left Iraq on the eve of Washington's December 1998 Desert Fox bombing, they said they had found and destroyed or rendered harmless 90 - 95% of Iraq's WMD programs. Iraq has said that they have destroyed other weapons, but do not have a complete paper trail to fully document their destruction. There is certainly no active nuclear program - that would be easily detectable by satellite and other technologies. While it is possible that some chemical or biological material from earlier weapons programs may remain in Iraq, as yet undetected by UN inspectors, there is no indication that a viable delivery system for such weapons exists.

The Bush administration claims Iraq does have WMDs - but they have refused to reveal the evidence they claim to have to the public and won't even provide all the evidence to the UN inspection teams. This contradicts Washington's claim of an imminent threat from Iraqi WMDs - were there such a threat, U.S. officials would surely immediately provide the inspectors all the information needed to neutralize the threat. By withholding the information, the U.S. seems more interested in playing "gotcha" than in actually finding and rendering harmless any real weapons.

Further, the emerging example of North Korean nuclear weapons may be instructive. If, as is the case in North Korea, there was actual evidence of an Iraqi nuclear weapon, Bush would be unlikely to be threatening to go to war against Iraq. Instead, a combination of diplomacy and deterrence would be used. The U.S. willingness to talk to nuclear-armed North Korea, while refusing to talk to Iraq, provides another clear indication that Iraq does not have nuclear weapons.

11. Did Iraq have anything to do with September 11th, or with al-Qaeda? Would going to war against Iraq improve the security of Americans at home and abroad?

Iraq had nothing to do with the September 11th attacks.

In fact, Iraq has a long history of antagonism to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. According to the New York Times: "[S]hortly after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, Osama bin Laden approached Prince Sultan bin Abdelaziz al-Saud, the Saudi defense minister, with an unusual proposition.…Arriving with maps and many diagrams, Mr. Bin Laden told Prince Sultan that the kingdom could avoid the indignity of allowing an army of American unbelievers to enter the kingdom to repel Iraq from Kuwait. He could lead the fight himself, he said, at the head of a group of former mujahideen that he said could number 100,000 men." Even though the offer was undoubtedly exaggerated, bin Laden's hostility toward secular Iraq is clear. There is no evidence that that has changed.

Far from making Americans more secure, there is every reason to fear that war against Iraq will place Americans in greater danger. Across the Middle East, anti-American feeling is already widespread due to U.S. financial and diplomatic backing of Israel's occupation of Palestinian land and its support for corrupt and repressive regimes across the Arab world. A U.S.-led war against Iraq will further exacerbate that anger, perhaps leading more desperate individuals to turn to acts of violence against individual Americans or institutions perceived as symbols of American power or policy.

12. If the U.S. doesn't attack Iraq, how can we be sure there are no weapons of mass destruction?

By supporting the United Nations weapons inspectors, whose mandate is to finish the job of earlier inspection teams by finding and rendering harmless any remaining weapons of mass destruction. We can get further reassurance by implementing Article 14 of UN Resolution 687, which states that disarming Iraq of WMDs should be seen as a step towards a region-wide Middle East "zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and a global ban on chemical weapons." Such an approach, rather than the current U.S. posture of flooding the arms-glutted region with ever more powerful weapons, would certainly help reduce military tensions in the region.

13. How much will war against Iraq cost? Who will pay for it and what will be its impact on the domestic U.S. economy?

Estimates range from $60 billion up to perhaps $1.6 trillion when the war's aftermath is included. Even the lower figures represents between 1 and 2% of the current U.S. GDP. The 1990-91 Gulf crisis cost about $80 billion, or about 1% of GDP, but 80% of that cost was paid by our allies, which is unlikely this time around.

The final bill will include far more than just the military deployments, troops and weapons. It will also include pay-offs to reluctant coalition partners. Turkey, for example, has made plain its conditions a U.S. war: compensation for up to $25 billion in losses, which Turkey says should come not from congressional legislation but directly from the Pentagon; a clear U.S. prohibition on creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq; and granting Turkey security control in northern Iraq. Not coincidentally, during a December 2002 visit to Ankara by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Turkey was promised lavish new economic aid, the construction of permanent military bases in the Kurdish southeast, and renewed diplomatic support, including a major U.S. campaign to back Turkey's entrance to the European Union.

And none of those initial costs of war include the price of reconstruction. Former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger recently testified that rebuilding the Iraqi economy would cost between $50 and $150 billion. But given Washington's habit of leading the war, and leaving the rebuilding to the United Nations and the rest of the international community (as seen most recently in Kosovo and Afghanistan), it is unlikely that the U.S. intends to pay for Iraq's reconstruction.

Even without a new war in Iraq, the U.S. spends more than $11,000/second on the military. That means more than $1 billion per day, half of all the world's military expenditures by our friends and adversaries combined.

14. The Administration has talked about plans for a long-term military occupation of Iraq. What would that mean?

Some in the Bush administration have advocated direct U.S. take-over of Iraq after a war, based on the occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II. This model imagines the world of 1945, before five decades of decolonization had reshaped the political frameworks of newly independent countries. It envisions a widespread Iraqi greeting of U.S. troops as not only immediate liberators but as acceptable, even welcome, permanent occupiers, unlikely given the widespread understanding in Iraq that U.S. pressure has kept the devastating economic sanctions in place for 12 years. It imagines the U.S. paying billions of dollars to rebuild a war-ravaged Iraqi economy. But everyone knows that is imaginary. Even the fractious and diverse U.S.-backed Iraqi opposition, meeting in London in December 2002, was able to agree on only one thing - that a U.S. military occupation of their country was not acceptable.

Occupation probably means immediate U.S. seizure of Iraq's oilfields, swift rehabilitation of the oil infrastructure, and rapid redistribution of oil contracts to U.S. companies. Iraq's oil income would be diverted to repay Washington for the costs of the invasion and occupation itself, delaying reconstruction of Iraq's battered social and physical civilian infrastructure indefinitely. And American troops - and Americans in general - would become the symbols throughout the region of a hated super-power.

Next Section: II. The World's Response, the UN & International Law

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